I. Introduction
Biometric verification schemes raise security concerns because biometric data is permanently associated with its owner and therefore cannot be replaced even if it is compromised. One of the most promising solutions to this problem is cancelable biometrics [2] , where a system does not store the original biometric data; rather, it stores only the version transformed by a noninvertible transform [3] . Then, verification is done on this transformed data without any need to recover the original data, keeping the original data safe even if the system is compromised.
Since Ratha and others pioneered the concept of cancelable biometrics [2] , various schemes have been introduced. A more detailed review of cancelable biometrics may be found in [3] and [4] . The most well-known scheme is Ratha's surface folding scheme for cancelable fingerprint templates [3] . It is claimed in [3] that the original fingerprint template is secure even if a transform and a transformed template using this transform are compromised. In this letter, however, we show that this claim does not always hold. The original fingerprint template can be recovered by a dictionary attack if an attacker obtains two transformed templates originating from an identical fingerprint template and their transformation parameters.
II. Ratha's Surface Folding Transform
Ratha's one-way transformation moves minutia positions using two-dimensional Gaussian functions defined over the feature domain. In this scheme, each user is given a unique key which specifies the centers and shapes of Gaussian kernels. These Gaussian kernels overlap to form two surfaces, F(x, y) and G(x, y), as shown in Fig. 1 . Then, they are used to decide the direction and amount of shift for each feature point at (x, y).
To be precise, a Gaussian mixture F(z) for a position vector
where the weight π i , covariance Λ i , and center μ i for each Gaussian kernel are parameters given by the key. We also define the phase of F for z as where Φ rand is a random phase offset, which is also given by the key. Another Gaussian mixture G(z) and its phase Φ G (z) are defined in a similar way.
Then, a transformation (x, y, Θ) (X΄, Y΄, Θ΄) is given by
where K is a predefined constant. Figure 1 shows examples of F and G produced by placing 24 Gaussian distributions in the 512×512 image space according to the key, where each distribution has a standard deviation of 50 pixels and a peak magnitude of either +1 or -1 as in [3] . The two mixtures are scaled so that the highest and lowest peaks have values of 1 and 0, respectively. Figure 2 shows an example of the transformation using these Gaussian mixtures.
Ratha and others [3] showed that the original fingerprint and its transformed version are difficult to correlate and claimed that inverting a transformed template into its original version is much harder than a naïve brute force attack.
III. Vulnerability of Surface Folding Transform
According to [3] , the transform depends only on the key. That is, all the parameters for the surfaces F and G as well as the phase offset Φ rand are specified by the key. If the transformation (the key) is revealed to an attacker, he or she can simulate the transform and build a dictionary that maps every possible point on the image space to its transformed one. The dictionary consists of pairs ((x, y), H(x, y) H(x, y) .
Note that the attacker is also given a transformed template T={m 1 ,…, m n }, where each m i represents a minutia point. Thus, the attacker can construct n sets C 1 through C n using the dictionary so that each C i contains all possible pre-images of m i . Then, the original template can be viewed either as an element in the Cartesian product C 1 ×…×C n or as a subset of union C 1 ∪ …∪ C n . For efficiency, we adopt the latter interpretation.
Note that we have too many candidates at this point in both of the interpretations. However, if the attacker obtains two or more pairs of (key, transformed template) originating from the same template by attacking a newly enrolled template of the same user one more time or by attacking multiple databases at the same time, the number of candidates can be substantially reduced by computing intersections of those sets.
Figures 3 and 4 present a typical example that we discovered in our experiment. Figure 3 shows two templates transformed from the same original template using two distinct keys, K and K΄. Figure 4 provides two lists of minutia points corresponding to the templates shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b), respectively. Note that minutia m 1 through m 37 and m΄ 1 through m΄ 37 are randomly enumerated; therefore, their order should not be interpreted as m i and m΄ i originating from the same point in the original template. We do not need any information for which m΄ i corresponds to a specific m j . For clarity, we explain the case in which m 3 and m΄ 2 come from the same original point. The highlighted minutia point in Fig. 3(a) represents m 3 = (317, 260) . Using the dictionary built from K, we obtain C 3 , the set of pre-images for m 3 , which contains two distinct possible sources (324, 217) and (362, 261). All the other sets C i are obtained in a similar way. Another key, K΄, helps us to construct another dictionary which tells us that the set C΄ 2 of pre-images for m΄ 2 = (359, 233) contains (324, 217) and (358, 279). Then, the point (324, 217) is one of the original minutia points with high probability. Algorithm 1 presents the procedure which generalizes this idea. We assume that we have two pairs, (K, T) and (K΄, T΄), where T and T' are templates transformed from an identical original template using K and K΄, respectively. Note that we do not need any other additional information for our attack. 
IV. Experimental Results
To verify the feasibility of our attack, we performed an experiment using 16 real fingerprints in FVC2002 DB1 [5] . They have 20 to 37 minutia points over a 388× 374 image space. Let O 1 ,…, O 16 be these fingerprints. We generated 100 random keys, K 1 ,…, K 100 , and produced 1,600 transformed templates T i,j =H Kj (O i ) for i = 1,…, 16 and j = 1,…, 100, where H Kj is the transformation using key K j which maps a 512×512-pixel image into another 512×512-pixel image.
We first tried the dictionary attack using a single transformed template. Given a single pair (K j , T i,j ), we produced a result U i,j by performing only steps 1 and 3 of algorithm 1. Our experiment shows that, in all of the 1,600 tests, all the minutia points in the original template O i are also included in U i,j . However, U i,j also contains additional points. Table 1 shows the numbers of these additional points. In most cases, U i,j contains too many additional points compared to O i . In a few extreme cases, however, the difference is very small, and the attack with only a single transformed template may be successful. The next experiment is for the case in which the attacker obtains two transformed templates. Table 2 implies that our attack is very successful. The second column indicates that, with a probability of 85.2%, there is no difference between O i and R i,j,k (output of algorithm 1). According to our timing estimation, dictionary construction (lines 1 and 2) and template recovery (lines 3 to 5) require averages of 464.16 s and 54.31 ms, respectively, over a PC with a Pentium IV 3.0 GHz CPU and 2 GB of RAM.
V. Conclusion
We demonstrated that the surface folding transform in [3] may not be secure if two transformed templates originating from the same fingerprint are compromised. This implies that the transform in [3] is not perfectly noninvertible. Therefore, a new scheme is needed which can effectively hide the original biometric data even when multiple transformed templates are revealed.
